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Abstract: The Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of Bangladesh, has been subject to 
an ongoing series of reforms. This paper provides an analytical description of the 
structure of the Bangladesh Bank; it reviews the reforms from their inception in 1982 
through the current Central Bank Strengthening Project and assesses their impact on 
the Bank’s performance and autonomy. The Grilli-Masciandro-Tabellini (GMT) 
indexes for political and economic autonomy are calculated. The Bangladesh Bank 
ranks below its peers in both GMT measures. 
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1. Introduction:  
 
Bangladesh Bank is the key player for the financial sector of Bangladesh as well as for 
the economy. Bangladesh Bank is the banker to the government as well as to other banks. 
It formulates and implements monetary policy, manages foreign exchange reserve and is 
the authority to supervise and regulate other banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
The financial sector of Bangladesh has gone through a lot of reforms in the past two 
decades and central bank reform was a key element of the reform agenda. This study 
maps the various reforms that have taken place so far. Bangladesh Bank has improved in 
certain areas and yet there are avenues where more can be done. The bank plays a dual 
role in the economy. Bangladesh Bank supervises and regulates the country’s banking 
sector where it has significant improvements. On the other hand, the bank underachieves 
in terms of autonomous formulation and implementation of monetary policy in 
coordination with the government.  
 
This paper is designed with the following objectives: 
 
- identify the most significant institutional reforms within Bangladesh Bank and their 
significance towards improved governance in financial sector, 
 
- identify significant policy changes of the monetary sector which reinforced and/or 
improved Bangladesh Banks capacity in governing the financial sector 
 
2. Methodology: 
 
The literature on Bangladesh Bank is fairly limited. However, there exists a large 
literature on certain issues related to the country’s banking sector. Studies were also 
conducted on the central bank to identify its weakness. A number of studies were 
conducted to evaluate the reforms of the financial sector.  
 
The paper is based on a qualitative survey research and both primary and secondary data 
are used for the study. For secondary data past literature and existing government sources 
are consulted. However, for primary data semi structured open-ended interviews were 
conducted with former and present central bank employees and experts1.  
 
The rest of the paper outlines the major reforms and changes that have taken place so far. 
We first discuss autonomy followed by legal framework issues, regulations and 
supervisions, human resources, automation and the role of media. The paper refers 
Bangladesh Bank as “the central bank” in the rest of the paper. 
 
                                                 
1 Interviews were conducted between July-August of 2006. A total of 13 former and present people were 
interviewed with follow-ups. 
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3. Chronology of Financial Sector Reform:2 
 
Bangladesh, after independence in 1971, inherited an undiversified and undeveloped 
financial system dominated by commercial banks. The then government nationalized all 
financial institutions except for a few foreign banks. Bangladesh Bank was established in 
1972 and the financial sector was under a regime of rigid government control. 
Government dictated the interest rates, direction of credit to Public Sector Enterprises and 
priority sectors with little regard to loan quality. Bank branches were expanded with an 
objective to increase access of the rural people to the formal banking sector. The 
government till 1982 owned all the financial institutions. Bank branches were opened 
ignoring the viability aspects and socio-economic considerations were given more 
priority in credit analysis and decision. Lending rates were low and did not cover the risk 
and actual cost factors. Unsophisticated and immature accounting and poor banking 
standard coupled with poor loan recovery started to afflict the banking sector. The 
operational efficiency declined and the customer service also deteriorated during this 
period (Chowdhuy & Raihan, 2000).  
 
            The reform process was first initiated in 1982 when two of the six nationalized 
commercial banks were denationalized and a number of licenses were awarded for 
private sector commercial banks. The objective on part of the government was to show its 
desire to encourage the private sector and create competition in the banking sector. The 
customer service of the banking sector has shown signs of improvement but the credit 
management was observed to have deteriorated. It transpires from various studies that 
denationalization and the privatization process failed to create desired impact due to lack 
of central bank’s capacity of strict supervision and rigid economic regulation for the 
sector (Bhattacharya and Chowdhury, 2003). 
 
            The reform measures failed to create an impact, as the operational efficiency did not 
improve. Vested interest groups emerged influencing the credit decision of the banks, 
both national and private sector banks. Accounting standard and practices of the 
commercial banks were not standardized and the reporting requirements were not up-to-
date. As a result, profitability of the banks came down (Chowdhuy & Raihan, 2000).  
 
The second phase began hand-in-hand with IMF/WB Structural Adjustment Program 
(SAP) as the government appointed the National Commission for Money, Banking and 
Credit. In 1986, the commission submitted a long list of recommendations to address 
problems in the banking sector. Among other findings and recommendations, Bangladesh 
Bank’s supervisory handicap, overall structure of the banking sector and Non-Performing 
Assets (NPA) were given due importance. Subsequently, recovery targets were set for the 
banks to improve the NPA situation along with barring defaulters getting fresh loans 
(Chowdhuy & Raihan, 2000). 
 
                                                 
2 This section largely draws from “The Financial Sector Reforms in Bangladesh: The Next round,” 
Bhattacharya and Chowdhury, 2003 and “ Structural Adjustment Participatory Review Initiative Study 
Theme (2): Implications of Financial Sector Reform”, Chowdhury & Raihan, 2000 
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At the beginning of the 1990s a wide range of reforms in the banking sector were 
initiated under Financial Sector Adjustment Credit (FSAC), the World Bank consultative 
mission. The Finance Sector Reform Project (FSRP) was also initiated in 1990 to assist in 
the implementation of the reform measures, which ended in 1996. In this attempt 
measures were taken to liberalize interest rate, enhance the capacity of loan classification 
and provisioning, capital restructuring and risk analysis, strengthening central bank and 
improving the legal system and framework for loan recovery. It an attempt to increase 
efficiency of the financial market, the FSAC of the WB came up with the following: 
gradual deregulation of interest rate, improvement in the debt recovery climate, 
strengthening the Capital market, adoption of appropriate monetary policy, making 
subsidies more transparent. The FSRP ended in 1996 but the reform measures continued 
to be pursued (Chowdhuy & Raihan, 2000). 
             
            The six-member Banks Reform Committee followed FSRP in 1996, which presented its 
report to the government in 1999. The committee gave highest priority in improving the 
regulatory and supervisory capacities of the central bank, along with strengthening legal 
framework and effective restructuring of central bank. Issues related to Bangladesh Bank 
Board, NCB boards and political influence on these were also addressed (Bhattacharya 
and Chowdhury, 2003). 
 
            In March 2003, the parliament passed three bills in its attempt to bring massive reforms 
in the banking as well as the financial sector. The key one was the Bangladesh Bank 
Amendment bill 2003, which gave the central bank autonomy in terms of its own 
operations and monetary policy formulation. This issue will be discussed in detail in the 
following section on autonomy.  
 
            Introduction of the Central Bank Strengthening Project (CBSP) in 2003 jointly funded by 
the World Bank and GoB is another important phase in the reform process. The objective 
is to achieve a strong and effective regulatory and supervisory system for Bangladesh’s 
banking sector. The project intends to assist BB in three broad areas3: 
 
(i) Strengthening the legal framework,  
 
(ii) Reorganizing and modernization of BB by focusing on  
(a) Functional reorganization 
(b) Automation 
(c) Human Resource Development 
 
(iii) Capacity building of BB by focusing on  
(a) Strengthening the research department 
(b) Strengthening prudential regulations and bank supervision 
(c) Strengthening Accounting and Auditing  
 
 
                                                 
3 Central Bank Strengthening Project: Gains Its Pace and Hope for Better Financial Sector Management, 
Information Note, The World Bank 
 3
Ahmed: Bangladesh Bank Reform                                                                                                   CGS WP 5 
4. Autonomy: 
 
Central bank autonomy refers to the extent to which the bank can carry out its operations 
independent of executive and legislative control. Generally, the degree of autonomy 
largely depends on the political will of the government.    
 
The Bangladesh Bank, since its inception, was not free of government influence. It was 
under the Ministry of Finance till 2003.  Bangladesh Bank Order of 1972 cited (a) price 
stability, (b) exchange rate and (c) economic growth and employment among major 
goals. According to this charter the broad objectives of the Bank were4:  
 
(a) to regulate the issue of the currency and keeping the reserves 
(b) to manage the monetary and credit system with the view of stabilizing domestic 
monetary value 
(c) to preserve the per value of taka 
(d) to promote and maintain a high level of production, employment and real income 
(e) to foster growth and development of the country’s productive resources 
 
The central bank has a dual role in the economy. On one hand, it has regulatory and 
supervisory authority on the country’s financial sector and also has a role to play in 
economic development. Throughout the 70s and early phase of 80s all the financial 
institutions were nationalized. The central bank lacked proper check and balance facilities 
to maintain financial sector discipline.   
 
            The central bank is awarded with autonomy through legislative measures and it is a 
significant reform of this decade. In March 2003, the parliament passed three bills in its 
attempt to bring massive reforms in the banking as well as the financial sector. The key 
one was the Bangladesh Bank Amendment bill 2003, which gave autonomy in terms of 
bank’s own operations and monetary policy formulation and implementation. It is 
conceived that this will ensure greater independence to the central bank in maintaining 
financial sector discipline. The 2003 order mandates the central bank: 
 
(a) to formulate and implement monetary policy 
(b) to formulate and implement intervention policy in the foreign exchange market 
and also maintain the official foreign exchange reserve 
(c) to advise the government on the interaction of the monetary with fiscal and 
exchange rate policy, on the impact of various policy measures on the economy 
and to propose legislative measures Bangladesh Bank considers necessary or 
appropriate to attain its objectives and perform its functions 
(d) to promote, regulate and ensure a secure and efficient payment system, including 
issue of bank notes 
(e) to regulate and supervise the banking companies and financial institutions 
 
In line with the international practice for strengthening corporate governance, an Audit 
Committee comprising four members of the non-executive directors was formed in 2002. 
                                                 
4 Notes on Monetary Policy Strategy of the Bangladesh Bank, PN0602, Vol. 1, Number 2, October 2005 
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The Audit Committee will assist the Board of Directors in fulfilling its oversight 
responsibilities for the financial reporting process, the system of internal control over 
financial reporting and audit process (Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2004-05).  
 
4.1. Central Bank Autonomy in Literature: 
 
The literature on central bank autonomy largely concentrates on the central bank’s ability 
to formulate and implement the monetary policy and on how much discretion it has in 
doing so. Schiffman (2004) argues that the concept of central bank autonomy has 
prevailed, the last decade has focused on transparency and accountability, but recently, 
the focus has moved towards good governance. Fischer (1995) and Guitian (1995) argue 
that strong accountability provisions should accompany central bank autonomy, to ensure 
that the authority delegated to the central bank is actually used as intended. Lybek (2004) 
opines that accountability of the central bank should be designed to ensure that the central 
bank uses its authority delegated to it effectively and efficiently. Ojo (2000) argues that 
the effectiveness of the autonomy decreed by legislation to conduct monetary policy in a 
credible way depends critically on the professionalism of the governor and the Board of 
Directors and also on whether the government allows the bank to perform free of political 
influence. 
 
A large section of literature distinguishes two types of central bank autonomy- goal/target 
autonomy and instrumental autonomy (e.g. Debelle and Fischer-1994). Lybek (2004) 
defines four broad types of central bank autonomy- 
 
(a) Goal autonomy: the central bank has the authority to determine its monetary 
policy and/or exchange rate regime. In case of the floating exchange rate regime it 
has the sole responsibility to determine the monetary policy. This type of 
autonomy in principle gives the central bank the authority to choose its objective 
from the core objectives defined in the central bank law. Or even has the liberty to 
decide one in the absence of any precise objective defined by the central bank 
law. This is the broadest type of central bank autonomy. 
(b) Target autonomy: This also entrusts the central bank with responsibilities to 
determine the monetary policy and exchange rate regime or simply the monetary 
policy when the exchange rate is floating. But the difference is, in such case, the 
central bank has clearly defined objectives in the central bank charter.  
(c) Instrumental autonomy: The executive branch or the legislature decides the 
monetary policy target and/or the exchange rate regime in consultation with the 
central bank. But the central bank retains sufficient authority to choose its policy 
tools, which it sees fit to achieve its target.  
(d) Limited or no autonomy: The central bank is a government agency; the 
government determines the policy objectives and targets as well as influences the 
implementation.  
 
The goal and target autonomy are considered to be the strongest forms of central bank 
autonomy. The European Monetary Institute uses the following attributes to verify 
whether a central bank has sufficient autonomy or not: institutional independence, 
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functional independence, organizational independence and financial independence. 
Ahmed (1997) argues that autonomy of central bank has many attributes, such as: 
independence of the central bank in its decision to give credit to the government, 
independence in meeting its expenses without depending on the government, 
independence of the Board of Directors in decision making, independences in 
formulating, choosing monetary policy tools and implementing them, independence in 
regulating and supervising the financial sector. Of all the above, the most important is 
independence in its decision to give credit to the government. Lybek (2004) argues that 
these are not types of autonomy but various elements of central bank autonomy. 
 
Grilli, Masciandro and Tabellini (1991), and Cukierman (1992) define central bank 
autonomy as having two main dimensions- political autonomy and economic autonomy. 
Grilli, Masciandro and Tabellini (1991) define political autonomy as the authority and 
ability of the central bank to select the objectives of the monetary policy. The authors 
employ the following criteria to measure “political autonomy”- 
 
• Appointment of the central bank governor is independent of government influence 
• The governor is appointed for tenure of more than five years 
• Members of the Board of Directors are appointed without government 
involvement 
• Board members are appointed for tenure more than five years 
• There is no mandatory participation of government representatives in the board 
• No government approval is required in formulating the monetary policy * 
• There are requirements in the central bank charter forcing the central bank to 
pursue monetary stability amongst its primary objectives * 
• There are provisions of legal protection that strengthens the central bank’s 
position in the event of a conflict with the government   
 
Economic autonomy is defined as the ability and authority in selecting the instruments. 
Similar to political autonomy the authors examine 5the following attributes to measure 
“economic autonomy” –  
 
• There is no automatic procedure for the government to obtain direct credit 
facilities from the central bank 
• Direct credit facilities are extended to the government at market interest rate 
• The credit is extended on a temporary basis  
• The credit is for a limited amount 
• There exists a limit on government borrowing from the central bank 
• The central bank does not participate in the primary market for public debt 
• The central bank sets the discount rate* 
• The central bank has no role to oversee the banking sector or shares this role with 
another separate organization 
 
                                                 
5 * indicate Bangladesh Bank satisfies these criteria    
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1 point is assigned for each the above criteria except for the last one of economic 
autonomy, where 2 points are assigned for no role and 1 point for sharing the 
responsibility. Summing the two sets of points yields two indices of the central bank 
autonomy. The stars indicate that Bangladesh Bank has fulfilled these categories. Based 
on this we can see that the bank has two points out of eight on political economy scale 
and one point out of eight on economic autonomy scale.  
 
We use the Lybek (2004) definition and also construct an index using the Grilli, 
Masciandro and Tabellini (1991) definition to investigate Bangladesh Bank’s autonomy. 
The following sections elaborate on issues related to the criterion designed for the GMT 
index.  
 
4.1.1 The Board of Directors:  
 
The Board of Directors for the central bank has nine members along with a secretary. The 
bank governor is the chairman of the Board with four members from civil society, three 
members from the Executive branch of the government along with one deputy governor. 
Participation from the Executive branch of the government in the Board is very high for 
the Bangladesh Bank in comparison to the central banks of India, Sri Lanka and Pakistan. 
In the above three countries only the Secretary for the Ministry of Finance is appointed as 
a Board member. The governor, deputy governors and the Board members all have a 
fixed tenure in the above countries.  
 
4.1.2 Appointment and Tenure: 
 
The government selects and appoints the governor, deputy governors and the members of 
the Board of Directors as per the central bank charter. The practice is very much 
centralized and ad hoc. The governor is selected and appointed by the government for 
tenure of 4 years and is eligible for re-appointment provided that the governor shall not 
hold office beyond the age of 65 years. The governor is the Chief Executive Officer and, 
on behalf of the Board, directs and controls the affairs of the central bank. The 
government can also appoint one or more deputy governors but their tenure is not 
specified in the charter. Government also nominates one of the deputy governors as a 
member of the Board. The tenure of the Board members who come from the Executive 
branch is discretion of the government. It is worth mentioning that Bangladesh Bank 
Order, 1972 had a fixed tenure for the deputy governor but the 2003 amendment order 
does not specify any tenure for the position. The members of the Board, who do not come 
from the Executive branch, are appointed by the government for tenure of three years and 
are eligible for re-appointment. The whole process is indicative of the role government 
has in selecting the Board as well as the governor and deputy governors and shows that 
government has enough discretion to control and influence the Board.  
 
Past trend shows that the central bank governor is changed with a regime change 
especially since 1991. While appointing a governor, government maintains secrecy and 
there is no formal selection procedure. Respondents during the interviews informed that 
there is no formal selection committee, which would officially select a number of 
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competent candidates and than make a formal suggestion. The incumbent government 
makes the decision, which usually comes from the top end. This again indicates to a 
highly centralized, non-transparent and ad hoc selection process.  
 
A more recent trend shows that the central bank governors are usually chosen on the 
basis of their academic qualification, preference is given to candidates with a PhD in 
Economics. Only one governor in the history of the central bank was a career central 
banker6. Informants told us that there are instances where the governor and the deputy 
governors lobby to remain in the current office.  
 
The government also appoints the deputy governors as per the central bank charter and 
the trend indicates to a degree of inconsistency. There were deputy governors, who were 
appointed from the commercial banks and also from the executive branch of the 
government. Informants told us that appointment of bureaucrats as deputy governors took 
place as a result of politics amongst the bureaucrats and this also indicates the control of 
the government on the central bank. One of the existing deputy governors7 is appointed 
from the private sector commercial banking sector. He is the first one to join the central 
bank with banking background in a foreign commercial bank. This appointment is 
perceived as an attempt to inject new thinking & practices, transfer of know how from the 
commercial sector in the working environment of the central bank.      
 
4.1.3 Accountability of the Bangladesh Bank: 
 
According to Bangladesh Bank Order 2003 the governor reports to the Parliamentary 
Standing Committee for the Ministry of Finance instead of directly reporting to the 
Ministry of Finance. A ruling party MP chairs the committee and most of the committee 
members are incumbent government MPs along with the finance minister. As per the 
parliamentary rules and procedures all the standing committees should sit at least once a 
month but the Parliament Watch report published by the Transparency International, 
Bangladesh shows that it is not a regular practice. As per this report of 2005, the standing 
committee for Ministry of Finance has sat only 7-9 times in 2005. This indicates that the 
parliamentary committee is not free of criticism in its own performance. It seems the 
parliamentary standing committee is not fully effective and lacks transparency and 
accountability.  
 
Leadership is a key element in the effective functioning of the central bank. The 
autonomy largely depends on the governor and the deputy governors’ capability to handle 
both outside and inside interference. There are political, administrative and business 
pressure groups that lobby the incumbent government on various aspects of the financial 
sector, which often falls within the jurisdiction of the central bank. For example, the 
Employee Union of the central bank has shown defiance of the management. The union 
has political connections both with the incumbent government and opposition. There is 
                                                 
6 Mr. AKN Ahmed, Governor, Bangladesh Bank, from 18/12/1974 to 13/07/1975 
7 Mr. Rumee A Ali, Deputy Governor  
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limited evidence of a strong stance taken by the top management in such situations and 
such failures can be attributed to political connection of the unions8.     
 
An independent source of income is another aspect of central bank autonomy. The central 
bank has its own source of income sufficient to meet operational expenses. However, it 
cannot re-structure the pay scale without prior approval from the Ministry of Finance. 
    
4.1.4 Monetary Policy Formulation: 
 
The ability to formulate and implement monetary policy free of influence from the 
government is a key indicator of central bank autonomy. The Bangladesh Bank 
(amendment) Order of 2003 gives greater independence to the central bank in pursuing 
the monetary policy. A separate unit for this was established within the central bank in 
2003 known as the Monetary Policy Department (MPD). Previously the department was 
known as the Monetary Management and Technical Unit.  
 
The broad objectives for monetary policy are outlined in the Bangladesh Bank Order, 
1972 which comprises the goal of achieving price stability, maintaining high levels of 
production and employment and economic growth. As per the central bank charter, the 
Policy Coordination Council, this is headed by the finance minister, coordinate monetary 
and fiscal policy. The governor of the central bank is a member of the council and the 
charter clearly sets out the role of the central bank in the council. The charter also defines 
the role of Ministry of Finance and Commerce in the monetary policy formulation 
process. This policy coordination council in effect could limit the central banks 
independence to formulate and implement monetary policy.  
 
In the 70s and 80s, monetary policy was conducted with full direct control of the central 
bank on interest rates and exchange rates. The central bank used to dictate the deposit and 
lending rates with a pegged exchange rate regime that served as nominal anchor for 
prices.  The central bank also controlled the volume and direction of credit as per 
government instruction. The situation began to change in the 90s through the Financial 
Sector Reform Programs (FSRP). Interest rate liberalization, privatization of the banking 
as well as non-bank financial sector, introduction of the Securities & Exchange 
Commission are related to the efforts to financial sector deepening in Bangladesh. A 
market oriented interest rate policy was adopted in 1990s under the Financial Sector 
Reform Program. The central bank changed its stance from directly dictating the market 
rates, both for deposits and advances, to indirect means. The process was gradual, as a 
number of sectors were kept beyond these reforms in the initial years.  On 31st March 
2003 Taka was floated as central bank adopted the flexible exchange rate regime. Since 
both the interest rate and exchange rate are market driven an ex-ante monetary policy 
stance has assumed importance in anchoring inflation expectations and dictating the 
monetary aggregates to the target level. Since January 2006 central bank started to 
publish the “Half-yearly Monetary Policy Statement” in its attempt to create ex-ante 
influence on the money market as well as on inflation.   
                                                 
8 The Daily Star, "CBA men besiege BB governor", 29 October 2003, “BB axes ten unionists”, 31 October 
2003, “BNP-backed CBA defies BB orders to relocate office” 26 December 2003 
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In recent years, central bank has been using indirect tools of monetary policy rather than 
directly dictating them. Key policy rates, that is, Treasury bill/bond auction yields, repo 
and reverse repo interest rate have been raised and maintained on upward trend. This, in 
turn, had affects on other banking sector rates. The structure of the financial sector in 
Bangladesh is such that interest rate intervention cannot alone influence the aggregate 
monetary variables and due to low level of financial sector deepening, the market rates 
are yet to gain sufficient depth and liquidity to respond to these changes. To compensate 
for this inadequate responsiveness to interest rate changes, the interest rate policy is 
supplemented with changes in the Cash Reserve Requirements (CRR) and the Statutory 
Liquidity Ratio (SLR) in an attempt to influence volume as well as the cost of funds. 
Recently, the above two rates were raised from 4.5 percent and 16.0 percent to 5.0 
percent and 18.0 percent respectively (Half-yearly Monetary Policy Statement, Jan. 
2006). In pursuit of monetary policy the central bank puts greater reliance on monetary 
targeting on variables such as broad money (M2), reserve money etc. In so doing, 
estimates of GDP growth, CPI are also used. However, aggregates like the GDP is 
calculated annually but many of the evaluations are done quarterly using quarterly values 
of the other variables. During the interviews it came out that the data obtained from other 
government agencies lack reliability and there is a lag, which affects the aforesaid 
analysis required for monetary policy formulation. Informants also indicated that there is 
also a lack of specialized personnel for conducting such high level analytical and 
empirical tasks necessary for formulating monetary policy.  
 
The policy stance (especially, the cautionary stance to curb inflation) taken by the central 
bank is not free of criticism and informants opined that at times they are government and 
donor dictated. In light of shortcomings in financial sector deepening, there is an element 
of doubt as to the efficacy of interest rate elasticity’s on private savings and money 
demand behavior (Policy Notes Series, 2005, Bangladesh Bank). Investment credit is a 
small share of total private sector credit and Ahmed & Islam (2006) argue that aggregate 
investment spending is not responsive to interest rate changes. In the disaggregate level it 
is still non-responsive except for private sector investment category which is only 
moderately responsive from the lenders’ point of view in the short run. The stance to curb 
inflation is not free of criticism as many argue that the current inflationary pressure is due 
to supply side problems and is not a monetary phenomenon. In a recent television 
interview, the Finance Minister also agreed to the fact that current inflationary pressure is 
due to market distortions created by the rent seeking behavior of the business sector9. 
Rising fuel prices also has a role to play in inflation situation in Bangladesh10. The central 
bank stance is based on the ‘Quantity Theory of Money’ assumption that is to restrain 
money demand through increasing the cost of holding money and thus affecting excess 
demand arising from inflationary expectations. But the cause of current inflation 
                                                 
9 The Daily Star, “Pricey Shocks” (Star Weekend Magazine) 29 October 2004, “Effective TCB needed to 
control Price hike”, 27 August 2006, “Power and Price”, 23 Sept. 2006, “Pricey essentials remained 
people’s permanent plight” 03 November 2006, “Only 7 or 8 Importers keep Market Hostage”- Source: 
UNB, Article published in www.bangladeshinfo.com,  
10 The Daily Star, “Fuel price hike again” 25 May 2005, The New Age, “MPs opt for leaving diesel, 
kerosene out of price hike”, 07 Sept. 2007 
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invalidates such transmission mechanism implemented through contractionary monetary 
policy.  
 
Ministry of Finance and multi-lateral donor organizations are criticized for influencing 
monetary policy formulation. In fact, a number of changes within the monetary sector, 
namely the interest rate deregulation, exchange rate regime change, ex-ante monetary 
policy statement etc. are donor dictated. Many believe, including both former and current 
central bankers, that the central bank does not have freedom in formulating the monetary 
policy independently.  
 
It came out during the interviews that the research department of the central bank lacked 
the analytical capacity to conduct in depth research on the economy. The research 
department under the central bank was not an attractive job placement for bright 
researchers because of low pay scale and low career profile. Policy Analysis Unit (PAU) 
has been established within the Research Department of the central bank to enhance the 
research capacity. PAU was establishment as an initiative of capacity building within the 
central bank under the CBSP, which is again a donor dictated change. Although the 
inception of this unit created a new impetus and the unit started producing proper 
research reports on the economy as well as on the financial sector, there are some 
problems associated with PAU. Its research findings do not directly contribute to the 
monetary policy formulation by the central bank. The Monetary Policy Department is a 
separate unit and there is a lack of proper coordination between the two in terms of 
feedback. The researchers recruited for the PAU have a separate pay scale, which is 
higher than the regular central bank staff. These new breed of researchers, however, do 
not consider this is as a permanent placement for their career. Further, there is no 
mechanism to transfer their skills to the regular research department staff members. In 
this circumstance, the long run sustainability and capacity building of the Research 
Department will depend on the ability of the central bank to integrate PAU and MPD.  
  
4.1.5 Government borrowing & the Central Bank: 
 
A key element in determining central bank autonomy is whether or not the central bank 
can refuse the government credit. This decision crucially affects the volume of money 
available to the central bank. Bangladesh Bank directly participates in the primary market 
for government bonds and the central government borrows from the bank to finance its 
budget deficit. The government borrowed a total of Taka 256.33 billion (approximately 
US$ 4175.45 million)11 in 2005 from the banking sector through T-bill auctions of 
various durations, government savings certificates and prize bonds. This also includes 
various advances made to various ministries (Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2004-05). 
The bank is compelled to lend to the government to finance its budget deficit, which 
limits the money supply. The government borrowing from the banking sector has two 
effects. On one hand it raises interest rate and reduces economic activity and, on the other 
hand, it reduces available funds for the private sector. The latter further reduces economic 
activity through crowding out effect. Hence, the central bank loses the freedom to choose 
monetary policy tools independently.  
                                                 
11 Annual average exchange rate US$ 1= Taka 61.39, Source: Bangladesh Bank 
 11
Ahmed: Bangladesh Bank Reform                                                                                                   CGS WP 5 
 
Figure 1 – Government borrowing from the Banking Sector 
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      Source: Monetary Policy Statement, July 13, 2006, Bangladesh Bank 
 
Figure 1 shows the amount borrowed by the government in the past seven quarters. In 
FY05, the government borrowed Taka 36.0 billion (1 percent of GDP) from the banking 
sector to finance its deficit (Bangladesh Bank Annual Report, 2004-05: 65). Shortfalls in 
revenue targets coupled with decline in foreign aid compel the government to borrow 
from the banking sector. Besides, various state-owned enterprises borrow from the 
banking sector and many of these credits become classified. As a result, the share of non-
performing loans (NPL) goes up.  
 
Government borrowing from the banking sector for financing budget deficits has been an 
occasional shock to the credit market equilibrium (Financial Sector Review 2006: 74, 
Bangladesh Bank). Informants opined that this is a window of government influence on 
central bank operations and the central bank should have the courage and authority to 
deny such credit to government. A limit can also be imposed on such borrowings. 
 
4.2 Autonomy of Bangladesh Bank: 
 
The argument presented so far allow us to determine the type of autonomy of the 
Bangladesh Bank as per the two definitions described earlier. The analysis of the 
Bangladesh Bank Order (1972) and Bangladesh Bank (amendment) Order, 2003 along 
with the “Half Yearly Monetary Policy Statements” of Bangladesh Bank suggest that the 
bank has “Target Autonomy”. This is considered to be one of the strongest forms of 
central bank autonomy in terms of the monetary policy formulation. Now it is important 
to investigate the operational aspects as well. Hence we use the Grilli, Masciandro and 
Tabellini (1991) index. The calculated GMT index, based on the above analysis, indicates 
poor operational freedom for Bangladesh Bank. The GMT score for Bangladesh Bank are 
compared with Arnone et al (2005) estimates. The latter define GMT index for three 
broad categories: advanced economies, emerging markets and developing nations and 
take the mean scores for political, economic and overall autonomy.  
 
 12
Ahmed: Bangladesh Bank Reform                                                                                                   CGS WP 5 
Figure 2 – GMT Index for Bangladesh Bank12 
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Figure 2 shows that Bangladesh Bank scores lower on both political and economic 
autonomy indicating lack of operational freedom despite legislature suggesting “Target 
Autonomy”. Comparisons with the autonomy scores of the rest of the world (Arnone et al 
2005) suggest Bangladesh Bank’s scores are lower than the mean score for developing 
countries. The scores indicate that all the three regional scores have lower ranking for 
political autonomy compared to that of economic autonomy. But for Bangladesh Bank 
political autonomy is higher than economic autonomy. This makes the Bangladesh 
Bank’s score inconsistent with that of developing countries’ mean score and others. Low 
ranking in the political autonomy may indicate that there is high political influence in 
central bank’s operation.  
 
It is to be noted that the central bank autonomy for Bangladesh Bank has similar scenario 
in the pre-reform era i.e. prior to 2003. The central bank charter indicates Target 
Autonomy and the GMT score remains the same. It seems that the changes in the central 
bank charter are not enough to create a significant impact on the autonomy and failed to 
bring about qualitative improvements in terms of central bank autonomy. In this 
connection, it is worth mentioning that some definitions (tenure of governor and board of 
directors) used for constructing the GMT scores have higher benchmark criteria and 
could not incorporate the changes in the charter.  
 
The informants, during the interviews, had similar views on the efficacy of the autonomy 
and opined that the legislation is not enough for the autonomy. Dr Fakhruddin Ahmed, 
ex-Governor of Bangladesh Bank, opined autonomy of Bangladesh Bank had to be 
earned and cannot be simply decreed13. A change in the central bank charter is not 
                                                 
12 Please see Arnone,Laurens, Segalotto and Sommer (2005) for details on this.    
13 Please visit the World Bank-Bangladesh site (www.worldbank.org.bd) report on  'Session V: Financial 
Sector and Development and Growth' of the workshop on 'Bangladesh:Strategy for Growth and 
Employment', December 12-13, 2005.  
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enough to bring about qualitative change. The role a central bank plays with respect to 
monetary policy formulation and implementation, governing the financial sector and 
interacting with government with respect to monetary and fiscal policy coordination 
overtime helps the bank to create confidence among the economic agents. The central 
bank itself needs to practice autonomy in terms decision-making and implementation, 
which would enhance its credibility.  
  
4.3 Credibility: 
 
Credibility of the central bank is another important aspect. It has to be credible in its 
operations and actions. The central bank has a dual role in the economy. On one hand it 
has to supervise and regulate the commercial banking sector and on the other hand it has 
to formulate and implement monetary policy.  Credibility crucially depends on these two 
aspects. The Central bank has not yet obtained such credibility in its actions and 
decisions. Factors, such as- high degree of autonomy, leadership and willingness of the 
central bank to overcome outside pressure, political will of the government to enable 
central bank to operate independently, contribute to the central bank credibility. 
Credibility has to be earned and it takes time for a central bank to achieve this.  
 
5. Legal Framework Reforms: 
 
A sound banking system requires an effective legal framework, which enables the central 
bank to supervise and/or regulate the money market with sufficient authority to maintain 
money market discipline. This should also enable the central bank to maintain an honest 
and disciplined lender-borrower relationship to facilitate loan recoveries and discourage 
defaults with provisions of punishment when default is willfully made. A strong and 
effective legal framework would enable the central bank to function properly and with 
confidence that there would be prompt and effective recourse in case any party feels 
wronged and aggrieved.  
 
Legal weaknesses and/or constraints are considered to be a key drawback of the 
Bangladesh Bank’s efficacy in terms of maintaining a sound-banking sector. The World 
Bank study titled “Strategy for Establishing a Sound and Competitive Banking Sector” 
identified three basic problems afflicting the financial system in Bangladesh. These are 
(a) a weak central bank, (b) poor governance and (c) a deficient legal framework. A key 
objective of the CBSP, initiated by the World Bank and Bangladesh Government, is to 
strengthen the legal framework for Bangladesh Bank.  
 
The major pieces of legislations concerning the banking sector are- 
 
• Bangladesh Bank Order, 1972 
• Bangladesh Bank (nationalization) Order, 1972 
• Negotiable Instruments Act, 1981  
• Bank Companies Act, 1991 
• Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993 
• Financial Institutions Act, 1993 
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• Deposit Insurance Act, 1999 
• Money Laundering Prevention Act, 2002 
 
Impetus created by competition among the financial intermediaries and the fast changing 
banking environment along with the financial sector developments require more 
appropriate regulatory and supervisory framework.  
 
Poor loan recovery or loan default can be attributed to the legal weakness of the banking 
sector. Bangladesh Bank annual report 2004-05 cites “……….the banks were reluctant to 
write off the historically bad loans because of poor quality of underlying collaterals and 
to avoid any possible legal complication due to lacunas in the judicial framework”. 
Chowdhury (2002)14 found the existing and newly formulated legislative measures, in 
light of the experience of their application, inadequate to deal with the problems of the 
banking sector.  
 
The following section largely draws from the Financial Sector Review (2006) that maps 
the recent reforms on the legal framework for the banking sector. Bangladesh Bank was 
given regulatory power by the Bangladesh Bank Order (1972) and the Bank Companies 
Act (1991). In order to provide greater operational and policy autonomy amendments of 
the Bangladesh Bank Order (1972), Bangladesh Bank (Nationalization) Order (1972) and 
Bank Company Act (1991) were ratified by the parliament in 2003. Amendment of the 
Bangladesh Bank Order (1972) redefined central bank functions in a more focused way 
by awarding enhanced authority and making it accountable for its performance. 
Bangladesh Bank (nationalization) order amendment was done with a view to improving 
governance of the NCBs. Amendment of the Bank Company Act (1991) gave 
Bangladesh Bank more authority and increased powers to regulate and supervise the 
banking sector. In addition, a new Financial (Money) Loan Court Act (2003) was setup to 
deal with problem of bad loans or loan default; and Money Laundering Prevention Act 
was formalized in 2002 to deal with the problem that has severe impact on the country’s 
money reserves. Financial Institutions Act (1993), Deposit Insurance Act (1999), 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act (1993) were designed to improve the money 
market discipline.     
 
Bangladesh Bank has hired a local law firm, which has international cooperation, to 
strengthen the legal framework of the bank and to enhance capacity building of the in-
house counsels. The firm is reviewing existing related laws and started compiling and 
rationalizing the circulars, directions and legal instruments issued by the bank.  Human 
resources with law background are hired and are groomed to give legal counsel as well as 
to train the staff on legal matters associated with the financial sector (Bangladesh Bank 
Annual Report 2004-05, Chapter 11). 
 
However, the weaknesses in the legal framework persist and can broadly be defined into 
two categories based on the review of the existing literature and the information obtained 
during the interviews. The first one is lack of enforcement on part of the central bank and 
                                                 
14 Politics, society and financial sector reforms in Bangladesh, Anis Chowdhury, International Journal of 
Social Economics, Vol. 29, No. 12, 2002 
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the second one is lack of compliance on part of the commercial banks and other financial 
institutions. The banking and financial sector in Bangladesh is currently very diverse and 
changing fast. The informants opined that the laws associated with this sector should 
change accordingly and-if necessary- new tools, and procedures and laws should be 
developed. The banking law permits the central bank to punish any commercial bank for 
any malpractice or non-compliance with current rules and procedures. There are 
examples where the central bank has fined commercial banks for such things but the 
amount is so meager that it often fails to create an impact: the central bank has fined 
Islamic Bank and Jubok Finance for irregularities. But newspaper report suggests such 
actions failed to create any impact15. The central bank dissolved the Board of Directors of 
the Oriental Bank and appointed an Administrator very recently. It was considered as a 
problem bank since 1994 and the central bank has been overseeing it from the beginning. 
Newspaper report indicates lack of compliance on part of Oriental Bank16. During the 
interviews, some informants indicated that there exists some form of collusion between 
the central bank officials and the commercial banks to overlook such anomalies. Another 
dimension to this problem is that a number of the private sector commercial banks have 
current or ex lawmakers and influential business people with political contacts in their 
Board of Directors. Loan default or bad loans are afflicting the banking sector and the 
issues of politicization are often considered as one of the root causes of loan default or 
bad loans.  
 
Bangladesh Bank has put into place rules and procedures to improve off-site and on-site 
supervision of the commercial banks and non-bank financial institutions. In the recent 
years, the central bank has formulated new corporate governance guidelines, prudential 
regulations and some other guidelines for the commercial banks and non-bank financial 
institutions, guidelines for core areas of risk management under the jurisdiction of the 
central bank. These are designed to structure the banking sector and harmonize them with 
international standards. The system is yet to become full proof, as there are loopholes. 
There are issues with lack of compliance on part of the commercial banks. One such area 
is the insider-borrowing problem. Collusion between corrupt commercial bank officials 
and businessmen also contribute to the problem of bad loans. Political interference, 
rampant insider borrowing, lack of impunity and frequent examples of arrogance by the 
defaulters towards the regulators/supervisors caused the decay of the system. 
Nationalized commercial banks (NCBs), owned by the government, have different 
governance structures. These new rules and procedures have limited applicability and 
effectiveness on the NCBs. However, the central bank has introduced new procedures on 
loan classification and provisioning along with other aspects of this problem to be 
discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
The Money Loan Court was established as per the Money Loan Court Act of 1991. It is 
yet to make a mark on the loan default scenario. Raihan and Chowdhury (2000) in the 
SAPRI study found that the settlements of suits have increased but amount recovered has 
                                                 
15 “BB Slaps Taka 1 Lakh fine on Islami Bank”- The New Age, April 06,2006,  
“Jubok asked to return money to depositors”- The Daily star, July 07, 2006 
16 Prothom Alo, “Oriental bank kelenkari- Oporadhi der birudhdhey foujdari ain e bebostha nite hobe”, 06 
October 2006 
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been stagnant. They also indicate that suits with small amounts were settled but the 
powerful large borrowers were out of reach, which points to the political influence. Islam 
(1999) revealed empirical evidence of collusion between politics and loan defaulters.  
The analysis shows that prior to implementation of SAP, the degree of political affiliation 
of the key person of the defaulted organization was higher than in the post-SAP period.  
 
 
6. Regulations and Supervision: 
 
Supervision and regulation are the functions of the central bank and an effective legal 
framework provide the central bank with necessary power to supervise and regulate the 
banking sector. Bangladesh Bank, the watchdog for the banking and financial sector, has 
formulated new guidelines and also introduced some acts in its attempt to improve its 
supervision of the financial sector. The main objective of such reforms is to improve the 
soundness of the banking sector. The central bank also has the authority to give new 
licenses for new banks and no existing bank can open a new branch in or outside the 
country or shift any branch from one place to another without obtaining a 
license/permission.  
 
Prudential regulation guidelines are developed to improve both on-site and off-site 
supervision and regulatory capacity of Bangladesh Bank. We discuss these issues in the 
following sections. 
 
 
6.1 Loan Classifications and Provisioning:  
 
Gross and/or net non-performing assets or loans (NPA/NPL) are considered the most 
important indicators identifying problems with asset quality. The high concentration of 
NPL’s is a major problem inflicting the banking system. Government dictated the credit 
disbursement in the early years and political influence also played its part in the decision 
making for loans from the banking sector. Besides, State Owned Enterprises also 
borrowed from the banking sector and these loans were never fully repaid17. In the recent 
past the NPL situation has worsened partially due to borrowing by the Bangladesh 
Petroleum Corporation from the NCBs18. Some steps were taken by the central bank to 
improve the scenario and the share of NPL has been coming down in the past few years 
yet there are issues that require immediate attention.    
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation and Bangladesh Jute Mills Corporation are the two biggest defaulting 
state owned entities.  
18 The Prothom Alo, “BPCr karone banking khate khelapi rine boro obonoti, khelapi rin 23 hajar koti taka 
o mot riner 16.59%”, 31 August, 2006 
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Table 1 – Ratio of Gross NPL to Total Loans by type of bank 
 
Bank Type 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Nationalized 
Commercial Banks 36.6 40.4 45.6 38.6 37 33.7 29 25.3 
Development Finance 
Institutions 65.7 66.7 65 62.6 61.8 56.2 47.4 42.9 
Private Commercial 
Banks 31.4 32.7 27.1 22 17 16.4 12.4 8.5 
Foreign Commercial 
Banks 3.6 4.1 3.8 3.4 3.3 2.6 2.7 1.5 
Total 37.5 40.7 41.1 34.9 31.5 28 22.1 17.6 
* without adjustment for actual provision and interest suspense. 
Source: Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2004-05 
 
The decline in NPL is not explained in detail, as the amount rescheduled or provisioned 
and the amount actually recovered or the amount written off are not specified. The table 
above indicates a higher concentration of the NPL/NPA in the state owned financial 
institutions. A recent newspaper article claims that total borrowing from the banking 
system totals Taka 8836 crore (US$ 1327.33 million approximately)19 and around Taka 
4109 crore (US$ 617.25 million approximately) is default loan. The article also claims 
that of the top 20 twenty defaulter firms, both state owned and private, 11 of them are not 
operating at the moment. The owners of these firms include influential political leaders as 
well as top business sector leaders20. For the PCBs, the Oriental Bank is an example of 
massive irregularities, which contributed to making bad loans. Bangladesh Bank has 
appointed an administrator and dismantled the Board of Directors of the Oriental Bank21.  
 
There is a tendency of provisioning of the existing default loans before the elections 
because loan defaulters are not allowed to participate in the parliamentary election. 
According to a newspaper report, there are instances where a few default loans were 
provisioned several times. As the regular repayments were not done in a timely manner 
they become classified again. Few requests of provisioning were turned down by the 
banks and the defaulters have rescheduled their loans by repaying an amount22.  
   
The loan classification system that used to be in operation in Bangladesh was more 
lenient than the international standard. They were not sufficient or even up-to-date with 
the rest of world in maintaining credit discipline and improving the recovery scenario. In 
literature, the problem of bad loans or loan default is considered to be a major problem 
                                                 
19 Annual average exchange rate as US$1= Taka 66.57, Source: Bangladesh Bank  
20 The Prothom Alo, “Shirsho 20 Rin khelapir egaroti prothisthan dirgho din dhore bondho”, 13 August 
2006, 
21 The Daily Star, “BB appoints administrator of Oriental Bank”, 23 August 2006 
22 The Prothom Alo, “Voter agey khelapi rin punoh topshil korte netara besto”, 23 August, 2006  
 
 18
Ahmed: Bangladesh Bank Reform                                                                                                   CGS WP 5 
afflicting the country’s banking sector. In its attempt to strengthen credit discipline and to 
bring loan classification in line with the international standards, Bangladesh Bank has 
introduced new guidelines. Credit Information Bureau (CIB) was set up, in 1992 under 
FSRP, to maintain the credit discipline. The objective was to minimize the extent of 
further loan defaults by providing more accurate information about the loan applicant to 
the banks. At present, a certificate from the CIB is necessary to obtain new loan from any 
commercial bank (Bangladesh Bank Annual Report 2004-05).   
 
As part of strengthening the prudential regulations and supervisions Bangladesh Bank has 
introduced a new loan ledger and an International Loan Ledger (IAS-30) for the 
scheduled banks. An attempt has been made to improve the loan classification and 
provisioning system and to harmonize this with the international standards. Bangladesh 
Bank has revised “Large Loans Rules” in 2002 to improve the loan classification 
situation. The new rule prescribes that the banks with net classified loan of up to five per 
cent will be allowed to sanction a maximum of 56 percent of the total loan and advances 
as “large loans". Earlier, with a comparable classified loan (<5 percent), a bank could 
lend up to 80 percent to large loan category. The banks with net classified loans between 
five percent and ten percent can now lend 52 percent of their portfolio as large loans 
against the previous allowable limit of 70 percent. The banks with net classified loans 
between 10 and 15 percent can lend up to 48 percent as against the previous 60 percent of 
their portfolio. For the next slot of up to 20 percent, the allowable large loan is 44 percent 
instead of the previous 50 percent (Bhattacharya & Chowdhury, 2003). In a recent 
Bangladesh Bank circular on loan classification both the objective and qualitative 
criterions are used to evaluate the loans and advances23. Interest earnings are evaluated 
separately and are included for classification and provisioning. Loans are categorized as 
(a) Continuous loans, (b) Demand loans, (c) Fixed term loans and (d) Short-term 
agricultural and micro-credit loans. Broadly, the loans and advances are categorized as 
unclassified and classified loans. Unclassified loans are further categorized as standard or 
under the Special Mention Account. A continuous credit, demand loan or term loan, 
which will remain overdue for a period of 90 days or more, will be put into SMA. Interest 
accrued from this loan will be credited to interest suspense account instead of the income 
account. However, this will not be reported to the CIB. The loans in SMA should be 
reported to the CIB. However, it is also reiterated that loans mentioned under the SMA 
will not be treated as default loan as per the Bank Companies Act, 1991. The classified 
ones are categorized as Sub-standard, Doubtful and Bad loans using repayment time as 
the criterion.  
 
Qualitative judgments are also introduced for classifications. If loans are illogically or 
repeatedly re-scheduled or the norms are violated or if a propensity to frequently exceed 
the loan limits are noticed or if legal action is lodged for recovery of the loan or if the 
loan is extended without the approval of the competent authority, or if situational changes 
occur on the part of the borrower- qualitative judgment will have to be used in classifying 
such loans or advances.  
 
 
                                                 
23 BRPD Circular No. 05 of June 05, 2006. Bangladesh Bank, www. Bangladesh-bank.org  
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6.2 Corporate Governance of Banks:  
 
The banking sector is a highly regulated industry all over the world, as the interest of the 
depositors as well as the shareholders needs to be protected. In countries where separate 
institutions are not in place to regulate and supervise commercial banks the central bank 
does the job. In Bangladesh, corporate governance of commercial banks has been a 
problem area for many years. In the recent past many significant reforms have taken 
place to improve corporate governance of banks. For example, the number of directors in 
a board has been reduced to 13 and one person can be a board member for only one bank. 
Near relations can not be in the board of the same bank and the roles of the advisor, board 
members and chief executives are redefined and restructured in a more pragmatic 
manner. “Fit and Proper Test” criteria are developed for board members, chief executive 
and advisors. Audit standards are developed and banks need to submit key information 
about their financial statement at least in two of the prominent newspapers. The effort is 
made to improve on the transparency and accountability in the private sector banking 
industry.   
 
Guidelines to manage the core risk for banks and financial institutions were introduced 
by the Bangladesh Bank. These guidelines lay out policies, procedures, processes and 
structures to core risks. Information Technology security guidelines, prudential 
regulations for banks and procurement guidelines were also put into place to improve 
supervision. 
 
Even with all the provisions at hand, during the interviews many experts opined that there 
could be separate agencies to regulate and supervise the private sector banking activities 
in Bangladesh. A number of agencies can be set up and each would look into a number 
aspects related to private sector banking. Under the current system, the commercial banks 
and financial institutions have to report to and are to a certain extent supervised by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, when they register with the stock exchange.  
 
6.3 Anti Money Laundering Measures: 
 
The formal banking channel was often used for transactions related to illegal activities. 
The international “Financial Action Task Force” formulated 40+9 requirements, which 
are to be followed by the banking sector of any country. Any country that does not 
comply is considered under the “Non-compliant countries and Territories” and 
eventually affects the country’s banking sector adversely. The Anti-money Laundering 
Unit (AMLU) of Bangladesh Bank was established in 2002 under the Anti Money 
Laundering Act (2002). The unit has the authority to investigate a suspicious account 
with acquisition of money laundering. If found guilty a written complaint from the money 
laundering unit is required to prosecute the accused by the money laundering court. The 
AMLU itself did not prosecute rather referred cases to the Anti-corruption Bureau. 
However, once the Anti-corruption Bureau was dissolved and replaced by the Anti-
corruption Commission in November 2004, the latter refused to prosecute such activities. 
The Criminal Investigation Department of Police is now handling money-laundering 
cases despite the fact that AMLU can do the same as per the act. An amendment of the 
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current act is proposed along with a proposal to create a separate organization to handle 
these activities with officers from the central bank, police and the attorney general’s 
office. 
 
To closely monitor money laundering and illegal financing and to prevent such activities 
Bangladesh Bank has instructed all commercial banks to report through Suspicious 
Transaction Report. Furthermore, all commercial banks are instructed by the central bank 
to submit a Cash Transaction Report of both deposit and withdrawal of BDT 0.5 million 
or above (US$ 7500 approximately)24 in a single account after reviewing the daily 
transaction. The central bank made “Know Your Client” policy mandatory for all 
commercial banks and financial institutions and has also instructed them to preserve all 
contact details of the customer along with a transaction profile (Bangladesh Bank Annual 
Report 2004-05, Bangladesh Bank Financial Sector Review-2006).  
 
Since the establishment of this unit bank supervision has gained a new dimension. But 
experts still believe that legal weakness might limit the efficacy of this unit, as it cannot 
prosecute any person under the current system. Any suspected account or person has to 
be surrendered to the law enforcement agency for prosecution. (Annual Bangladesh Bank 
Report 2004-05, Bangladesh Bank Financial Sector Review-2006)  
 
7. Human Resources and Recruitment:  
 
The administrative capacity of the central bank has been limited due to a shortage of 
specialized and efficient human resource. When the central bank was first established 
recruitment was not merit based. The scarcity of meritorious personnel to run the 
operations lead to ad hoc recruitment of people without proper expertise or even without 
proper academic qualifications. Informants told us that there are examples of people 
joining central bank as clerks but were promoted to higher positions even though they 
were not sufficiently qualified. The nationalization order of 1972 also created with stroke 
of pen central bank employees out of contract personnel without proper qualifications. 
There were little direct recruitment in the past three decades and most of the recruitments 
took place sporadically. However, in the past few years central bank has been recruiting 
regularly at the Assistant Director level and has also decided not to recruit below this 
level. During the interviews informants viewed the decision of recruiting officers at the 
Assistant Director level related to the automation of the central bank. They opined that 
automation would create redundancy. When the automation is completed the central bank 
would have relatively a small share of employees who would become redundant. This 
would help the central bank to decide effectively and quickly as redundancy often creates 
problems. This would also reduce employee union activities within the central bank.   
 
Informants further told us that the promotion policy was not based on performance; rather 
it was seniority driven and like other government organizations; politics also played a 
dominant role for promotions. There is also grievance amongst the employees as they feel 
that there is no uniform promotion policy for all divisions of the central bank. The “Status 
Quo” between promoted officers and directly recruited officers was also an issue. The 
                                                 
24 Annual average exchange rate as US$1= Taka 66.57, Source: Bangladesh Bank 
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employee union (CBA) leaders often intervened in the management’s decision on 
postings. The central bank has introduced newly formulated “Performance Management 
System (PMS)” under the Central Bank Strengthening project. This system demarcates 
the delegation of work by each level of employees in a more systematic manner and sets 
out objectives and targets to be achieved in a year.  This new procedure is put into place 
to make the evaluation of the staff more transparent unlike the previous system known as 
the Annual Confidential Report (ACR).  
 
Some current and past top management of the central bank opined that the training and 
grooming of central bank officials has not been satisfactory. Recently the central bank 
initiated an overhaul of the training procedure for newly recruited personnel. As per new 
training procedures, newly recruited staff members undergo a one-year long training, 
which was previously six-months long. During this one year, first six months is assigned 
for academic training at the Bangladesh Bank Training Academy and than spend the next 
4 months at various departments under the central bank. The last two months are spent in 
a private commercial bank to get a hands-on experience of commercial banking. Training 
uses better tools and the central bank has also initiated specialization of some personnel 
in various aspects of commercial banking.  
 
Informants told us that in the past, overseas training was awarded on the basis of seniority 
and creation of future knowledge base amongst the newly recruited ones was not 
considered as a priority. Not many central bank officials got the opportunity to go for 
higher studies abroad.  One can find many executive officers with higher academic 
training, especially PhD in Economics or Finance or Management, but at the central bank 
it is still a rarity.  Recently, some of the donor countries are providing opportunities for 
higher education and training to Bangladesh Bank officials.   
 
Bangladesh Bank has outsourced its entry examination process. Usually, the Institute of 
Business Administration or the Finance Department of Dhaka University or the 
Bangladesh Institute of Bank Management conducts the test, to set the questionnaires and 
evaluate the answers. The process has been working well and it helps to identify 
meritorious candidates. However, similar specialized recruitments for departments like  
Research, Statistics and Monetary Policy Department would also be useful. 
 
The pay scale is a key issue for the central bank employees. The pay scale offered is 
much lower than in the private sector commercial banks. The informants ranked low pay 
scale as a key reason for not having enough talented and meritorious Bangladeshis 
joining the central bank service.  
 
8. Automation:  
 
A key objective of the Central Bank Strengthening Project is to modernize and reorganize 
the central bank. Automation is one of the means designed to achieve this. It is widely 
accepted that the automation of the central bank would increase efficiency through proper 
utilization of the facilities that will be available through better networking.  
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The private sector commercial banks were the first to introduce automation in the 
banking industry. In the early 90s, some of the private sector commercial banks 
(especially foreign banks) in Bangladesh introduced IT and communication technology in 
the banking business. The local private commercial banks soon followed the trend. 
Although, not all private banks went for a complete automation the use of computers and 
IT increased in the past decade. The state-owned commercial banks (Nationalized 
Commercial Banks) are yet to be automated but several private sector banks are now 
successfully using the automated banking system. The central bank has recently 
introduced the IT Guideline for the Commercial Banks.   
 
The central bank itself is yet to adopt its own automated network. As mentioned earlier 
under the CBSP, the central bank has taken initiative to introduce IT and communication 
technology to improve its operations. The project is still in progress and has been divided 
into six different packages. A network integrator will be hired to integrate the whole 
system. Sources said the project was divided due to political influence. It was also opined 
that this splitting up would make the integration difficult in the future. 
 
9. Role of Media: 
 
The print and electronic media, by giving due coverage on central bank activities have 
definitely improved the transparency and accountability of the central bank. Newspapers 
have been regularly reporting on various issues related to central bank supervision and 
regulation of the commercial banking sector. This has contributed significantly to 
improving the accountability and transparency in the banking sector.  
  
The information about the central bank also improved. In the past, the governor needed 
approval from the Ministry of Finance to meet the press. The rule has been abolished and 
the governor is more open to the public both through print and electronic media.  
 
The bank has developed a new website and has been posting a lot of information about its 
activities bringing a welcome change from the past. All the information and manuals 
related to the commercial banking are uploaded on to the website. The “Repo” and 
“Reverse-Repo” auction results are also available on the web. The annual and monthly 
reports are published regularly and are made public through the website. All the research 
reports of various departments of central bank are now made public as well and 
accessible on the website.  
 
A very recent innovation is the publication of “Half Yearly Monetary Policy” statement, 
which is a standard practice by the central banks of other countries. It is expected that this 
would act as a catalyst in improving transparency and accountability of the central bank 
in Bangladesh.  
 
The Official Secrecy Act, if replaced by Right to Information Act, would definitely 
improve accountability and transparency of central bank operations. This would reinforce 
the central bank autonomy sought through legislative changes back in 2003.   
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10. Conclusion: 
 
The reforms that have taken place over the past two decades helped the central bank to 
evolve to a stronger position compared to the past. These reforms enabled the central 
bank to govern the financial sector in a more focused and objective manner. It has 
gradually developed the rules and procedures along with the fit and proper test criteria to 
maintain financial sector discipline. These changes can increase financial intermediation 
and enhance financial deepening. However, it seems that many of the changes are donor 
dictated rather than to be domestically formulated. The chronology of the reforms and the 
evaluation of the various reforms associated with central bank and financial sector 
suggest and indicate donor participation.  
 
The privatization process along with the financial sector reforms and with globalization 
necessitated further impetus in the process of reform. The reforms should continue as 
new nuts and bolts are required for a smooth functioning of the financial market. Steps 
are taken by the government but are slow and are often not complete. It came clear in the 
interviews with the stakeholders that some of the reforms and proposed guidelines and 
laws are not getting through as they might hinder the interests of vested groups such as 
employee union, corrupt business men and even bank employees. These vested groups 
have political connections and often exert political pressure, which can result in a lack of 
discipline in the financial sector. The situation has become more complex as business and 
politics have joined hands with businessmen entering politics.  
 
The government borrowing from the central bank and the formal banking sector is opined 
to be detrimental to the financial sector. This is a window of government influence on the 
central bank. A remedy for it could be a limit on the borrowings or directed to some pre-
defined sectors rather than abrupt borrowings by the government. 
 
Loan default is a major problem afflicting the country’s banking as well as financial 
sector. Strict steps are expected from the central bank to facilitate recovery of non-
performing loans.  
 
The regulation and supervision activities of the central bank should be decentralized and 
outsourced by creating new agencies. Many countries have adopted this and experts in 
the country think that this possibility should be explored. The central bank can thus work 
on monetary policy in a more focused manner and in a credible way.  
 
An autonomous central bank could be more credible in its decisions and actions. Less 
government influence reduced mandatory participation from the executive wing in the 
central bank affairs and most importantly less politicization would help create a more 
autonomous and professional environment for the central bank.  
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Appendix A 
 
List of Bangladesh Bank Governors 
 
Dr. Salehuddin Ahmed          May  2005 to   
 
Dr. Fakhruddin Ahmed  November 29, 2001 to April 30, 2005 
 
Dr. Mohammed Farashuddin  November 24, 1998 to November 22, 2001 
 
Mr. Lutfar Rahman Sarkar  November 21, 1996 to November 21, 1996 
 
Mr. Khorshed Alam   December 20, 1992 to November 21, 1996 
 
Mr. Shegufta Bakht Chaudhuri April 12, 1987 to December 19, 1992 
 
Mr. M Nurul Islam   July 13, 1976 to April 12, 1987 
 
Mr. A K N Ahmed   November 18, 1974 to July 13, 1976 
 
Mr. A N M Hamidullah  January 18, 1972 to November 18, 19784 
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Appendix B: Measuring Autonomy 
 
Political autonomy is defined as the authority and ability of the central bank to select the 
objectives of the monetary policy. The authors employ the following criteria to measure 
“political autonomy”- 
           
Criteria Yes No 
Appointment of the central bank governor is independent of government 
influence   
The governor is appointed for tenure of more than five years   
Members of the Board of Directors are appointed without government 
involvement   
Board members are appointed for tenure more than five years   
There is no mandatory participation of government representatives in the 
board   
No government approval is required in formulating the monetary policy 1  
There are requirements in the central bank charter forcing the central 
bank to pursue monetary stability amongst its primary objectives 1  
There are provisions of legal protection that strengthens the central 
bank’s position in the event of a conflict with the government   
Total (out of 8) 2  
  
Economic autonomy is defined as the ability and authority in selecting the instruments. 
Similar to political autonomy the authors examine at the following attributes to measure 
“economic autonomy” –  
 
Criteria Yes No 
There is no automatic procedure for the government to obtain direct 
credit facilities from the central bank   
Direct credit facilities are extended to the government at market interest 
rate   
The credit is extended on a temporary basis   
The credit is for a limited amount   
There exists a limit on government borrowing from the central bank   
The central bank does not participate in the primary market for public 
debt   
The central bank sets the discount rate 1  
The central bank has no role to oversee the banking sector or shares this 
role with another separate organization   
Total (out of 8) 1  
 
The central bank gets 1 point for every yes i.e. the bank has fulfilled the criteria.   
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